Winston Churchill is reputed to have said: ‘Democracy is the worst form of government except for all the other forms that have been tried from time to time’. In a spirit of trying to improve New Zealand and create the circumstances to implement real change, what can be done in 2020, to improve our democratic system? Would such a modified system be able to enact significant change?
WHAT BENEFITS DOES DEMOCRACY TRULY DELIVER?
Democracy is perceived by many to be a guarding against power-hungry politicians aggregating too much power to themselves. Regular elections, a properly functioning parliamentary opposition, and an independent judiciary and media, all on occasion limit political impropriety. These are undoubtedly valuable safeguards, and major benefits of democracy. It also provides a ‘safety valve’, whereby voters can express their frustration, without having to march in the streets.
Note these are both negative benefits. Democracy stops governments stepping out of line. And it provides a safety valve for popular disapproval, short of civil unrest. Democracy does little to help deliver fast, efficient or cohesive policy and direction for the country.
WHAT ARE THE DRAWBACKS OF DEMOCRACY?
Voters frequently take a self interested, short term view. They tend to support policies designed to give them an early benefit, rather than policies which are longer term and ultimately better for the country.
The democratic system frequently encourages politicians to favour short termism; to offer emotive policies, designed to resonate with the electorate, rather than good policies for the country. And most of all, modern elections have become occasions when political rivals usually compete to outspend each other and buy votes- irrespective of whether this is good for the country or not.
Politicians have to sell their policies, in order to get the votes they need. They are constantly in danger of overselling. Scepticism of the political system abounds.
Modern media are increasingly influenced by spin doctors. News is increasingly delivered online rather than through established channels like newspapers and TV with their standards of journalism to maintain. The truth, especially during elections, is often hard to find.
PARTISAN POLITICS
Partisan politics is hugely wasteful and unfortunate. Yes, there are instances, (possibly more in Parliament’s select committees working largely out of the limelight) where all parts of the political spectrum combine in the national interest. Yes, there are occasions where having an opposition to hold the government to account is advantageous for the country. But frequently partisan politics degenerates into trench warfare. It prevents Parliament as a whole distilling the best from all sides of arguments. The waste to the country from this approach, is surely enormous.
Political partisanship has another downside. Many good people who wish to try and do good things for their country, bypass politics because the likely outcome is unpleasant criticism for their efforts. I am sure most MPs enter Parliament with good intentions for their country. But the adversarial party system crushes them and minimizes the positives they can achieve.
LOOK AFTER YOUR POLITICAL MATES
Much political decision making has mutual back scratching as an important driver. Parties entering government, favour their support groups, rather than adopting policies in the overall national interest. They also tend to reward their own key workers with plum government appointments. A Government needs people sympathetic to its cause, to work with in key positions. But this reward of people because they are good party supporters, rather than the best for the job, is also a downside for the country. If we seriously want to improve New Zealand, we need to stop political patronage.
I have also suggested in foregoing my chapter on Corruption, that we should minimise political donations, to limit the opportunity for vested interests unduly to influence policy.
HARD POLITICAL DECISIONS AND THE ELECTORAL CYCLE
For politicians, gaining and then holding power, is their primary motivation. Their focus is always the next election. Hard issues which could upset that forthcoming election are avoided if possible.
These ‘deferred’ hard decisions are a major cost of our democratic system. Superannuation has been the worst example of this in New Zealand; but there are plenty of other examples. Often ducking a hard topic involves leaving unchallenged a vested interest which is damaging the country, because sorting out that policy area is too politically difficult.
PREVIOUS ATTEMPTS TO LIMIT DEMOCRACY’S FAILINGS
Many attempts have been made in the past, to modify and improve Democracy. Consider the following:
British civil service. Britain established a highly skilled civil service (with special civil service exams) so intelligent people could have an important role in steering the country from behind the scenes. The success of the British Empire from Victorian times when this quality civil service system was established, suggests it was definitely beneficial for Britain.
United States: flexible academic and commercial involvement. The President appoints a cabinet which is unelected, so he has room to bring in outside experts. He also makes many diplomatic and other appointments.
While large donors and cronies are appointed, there is also a tradition in the US of involving leaders from academia and from commerce, as part of these appointments. There appears to be a drawing in of leading figures from society, into government – often for limited periods. There is fluidity of movement of top people between government, universities, and commerce in the US. Top US people from outside the political system, no doubt help improve government outcomes.
THE EUROPEAN MODEL: PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION
New Zealand has adopted proportional representation in the form of MMP. It was surely designed to be a political system under which it is very difficult for politicians to change very much at all. The thinking being, you can’t trust the politicians to run the country well, so limit the damage they can do with a system which makes it difficult to make significant change.
I visited the Danish parliament about two years ago. The largest party had received about 17% of the vote. There were 8 parties. Three of them, comprising 43% of Parliament, had formed the government. MINORITY GOVERNMENT WAS THE NORM IN DENMARK. For a minority government to pass anything it had to find other parties totalling 7% in the Parliament, to make a majority on that issue. Danish minority governments are limited in their ability to make significant change.
The especially interesting aspect of the visit, was the way adversary politics of necessity was played down in Denmark. If before it can do anything, the minority Government has to put together deals with other parties in the Parliament on every issue it addresses, it needs to keep reasonable relations with all those other parties. Danish MP’s are seated alphabetically, not in party blocks. Working among different parties in the Parliament, whether they are inside or outside the government, is constant.
NEW ZEALAND’s MAJORITY COALITIONS
New Zealand has never operated proportional representation along Danish lines. We were accustomed to a Westminster system where there was always a majority government. So although we introduced MMP at the 1996 election, political parties after every election since have formed a majority coalition: the same as a Westminster majority government except it is made up from more than one party.
Once that majority MMP coalition has formed, it uses its majority to pass what it likes. There is more of a constraint than when all power was awarded to a single party in ‘first past the post’ (FPP) at elections before 1996, because coalition partners do on occasion restrain the largest party in the coalition. But the constraints on majority coalition governments in New Zealand are significantly less than in Scandinavia.
Unlike Denmark, there has been little attempt in NZ by the major parties to reach for support across party lines, when a coalition partner has blocked action on a particular issue. It seems seldom to have occurred to Labour and National that they could combine on the odd issue and shut out minor party objections. One occasion when an extra-coalition agreement did occur was in the first MMP Parliament, 1996-1999. ACT (then supporting National on votes of confidence and supply) promoted a change to police retirement ages. National refused to support the change. ACT and Labour then voted together to pass the legislation. If there have been other occasions of disparate party agreements they have been rare. New Zealand’s majority MMP coalitions have essentially behaved in a similar manner to majority FPP governments.
This has surely been a failing in the way MMP has operated in NZ. An environment where political parties regularly consider working together is more conducive to drawing the best out of all sides of policy issues, in the country’s interest. So far our politicians seem unable to generate such an approach.
COULD NZ OFFSET THESE MMP DRAWBACKS?
I suggest there are two alternatives. EITHER get parties thinking across the political divide, and coming up with policies in the national interest, OR (if this proves impossible), reform MMP to reduce small party influence. The first alternative is the preferable one but if parties and their members cannot make a mental change and stop thinking solely along ‘them and us’ lines, New Zealand has adopted MMP for little gain. In that case, modify MMP by minimising the opportunity for the smaller parties to hold the country to ransom.
- MAKE MMP WORK BETTER
Imagine Party A (43%) and Party B (40%) are the two largest parties in the parliament. Lets say Party A (in a coalition with parties D & E, who each have 6%) wants tax policies 1 & 2. But Parties D & E refuse to support these. Suppose Party B (outside the coalition) wants tax polices 2 & 3. Suppose Parties A & B get together and enact taxes 1, 2 and 3. Both major parties have got what they want and both major parties have agreed as the price for doing that to swallow one of the other party’s pet taxes. This is an example of the sort of outcomes which hopefully MMP could deliver in the future if New Zealand politicians could become more flexible.
Now suppose Party A goes back to its majority coalition (with parties D & E). Parties A+D+E in total have 55% of the votes in Parliament. Parties A, D, and E then repeal tax 3- the pet tax which Party B wanted enacted as its price for co-operating in getting the whole tax package enacted. This partial repeal, would leave just taxes 1 & 2, the taxes Party A wanted all along. Party B would clearly not be happy. When Party B was next asked to consider agreeing to a different ‘cross-party law’, it would almost certainly refuse.
So the first thing that is needed, if parties are to be encouraged to think across the political divide, is some way to lock cross party co-operatively-enacted laws into place.
SUPER MAJORITIES
In the above example, Parties A and B, in combining to enact Taxes 1, 2,and 3, will have passed these three taxes with 83% of the votes in parliament. A major emphasis of this chapter, is that on key issues for the country, the two main parties need to be able to get together, and enact laws with what I will call ‘SUPER MAJORITIES’. Whether that is set at 66% of Parliament, or even 75% of Parliament, those laws enacted with super majorities, could then only be amended or later changed, with a further Super Majority. Passing a law with a super majority is much the same as legally entrenching that law. If key ‘across the political divide’ laws could be passed by super majorities, which lock them into place, until they are amended or repealed with another later super majority, this should encourage cross party co-operation, and a more stable policy direction for the country.
PUTTING SUPER MAJORTIES INTO EFFECT.
There used to be a theory that Parliament couldn’t bind future parliaments, so a 51% vote of a future parliament could repeal law passed in a previous Parliament by a super majority. To make sure this cannot happen Parliament needs to pass a law which defines a super majority and says a law enacted by a super majority can be amended or repealed only by another super majority. That law should be enacted by a super majority, then put in front of the Supreme Court. Ideally the Supreme Court will endorse the proposal so parties thereafter will have confidence that laws passed with super majorities can only be changed or repealed with a similar super majority.
COURT UPHOLDING OF LAWS PASSED WITH SUPERMAJORITIES
There is another implication of super majorities. They represent a ‘half way house’ towards a written constitution. I believe New Zealand does not want or need a written constitution; but if a law is enacted with a super majority then any later law passed with a simple 51% majority, which is inconsistent with that super majority law would need to be invalid. So (to continue with the tax example), say for example Parties A, D & E combined with their 55% and passed a law saying Tax 3 was only payable by people living on Stewart Island. That amendment would negate 99.5% of the effect of Tax 3- and Party B would again be unhappy.
That possibility means the concept of parliamentary super majorities would require the courts to rule on occasion whether a law passed later by a simple majority was consistent or inconsistent with a law earlier passed with a super majority. If inconsistent, then the court would declare that later law invalid unless and until the later inconsistent law was itself passed with a super majority.
If the concept of super majorities was to be adopted, then for the first time the courts in New Zealand would become involved in determining the validity of laws passed by Parliament. We would need to make sure all such questions of whether a later law is inconsistent with a super majority law are referred directly to the Supreme Court, to avoid legal challenges working their way through the court system for years. Also, give Parliament the right to refer any question of consistency or inconsistency to the Supreme Court before the later law is finally brought into effect, so borderline cases can be sorted out in advance.
HOW TO GET PARTIES THINKING MORE CO-OPERATIVELY?
Suppose provision for super majority laws was put in place. The very creation of such a framework would surely encourage parties to consider cross party agreements more often, which would be positive in itself.
But could further impetus then be given to parties, to evolve from their trench warfare/ adversarial politics mode of thinking, to something more flexible? Might mediation be a possibility? Over the last 40 years mediation has appeared as a significant new development in the legal profession. A good mediator increases the chances disputing parties resolve a dispute they could not have agreed on their own. Could a mediator help political parties negotiate around the worst excesses of the adversarial system, and distil the best points from both sides of their political arguments?
It is essential that in mediation, confidentiality be maintained, so participants can speak their mind, and even make proposals which they may later back away from. Keeping confidentiality in a political mediation, where leaking to the media is always possible, would be challenging. But it does seem possible that in the case of at least some political issues, mediation may help.
Are political parties yet ready for these changes. Can they be more flexible and make MMP work better? Probably not yet. But if times changed after Covid, and the country came under real pressure, then hopefully some positive changes to the MMP system would be possible.
2, MODIFY MMP TO AVOID TYRANY BY MINOR PARTIES
Suppose these changes outlined for MMP prove impossible. That means MMP as practiced in NZ, is really basically FPP in disguise. It is true on occasion the minority coalition partner party may restrain the rest of the coalition internally. That is a benefit MMP has delivered. But that benefit comes with drawbacks. MMP has encouraged minor parties to strive for a position where they hold the deciding numbers- where they are the key which makes the coalition complete. When a minority party achieves that position, it sells those key votes to the highest bidder in return for plum jobs in the new government, and in return for having their pet policies pursued by the coalition they agree to join. This blatant horse trading gives undue power to minor parties and is not in the country’S best interest. It is a negative cost of MMP. The benefit of restraining voices in the MMP majority coalition is offset by the downside of giving too much power to minor parties, if/when they are left holding key deciding votes.
This excess influence could be rectified by separating the two votes everyone has at elections under MMP. At the moment, the vote for a party determines the proportionality of party representation of 100% of the parliament. Could this be changed? The electorate vote already elects 60 electorate MPs (50% of the Parliament) on a FPP basis. The party vote could elect only the other 60 MPs (50% of the parliament) on a proportional basis. That would be a much easier electoral system to understand than the present voting system we have in New Zealand.
This change would halve the influence of minor parties. Parliament would still have independent parties and wider representation; but the opportunity for minor parties to hold the country to ransom, would be reduced. Labour and National would need to get together to push through such a change.
If however, super majorities were established and cross party agreements outside formal coalitions became possible, the need to water down the influence of small parties is reduced. If a small party in those circumstances tried to hang out for too much on a particular policy, the two major parties could get together on that issue and bypass the smaller party. The flexibility which cross party agreements create, correspondingly reduces the quasi ‘Veto power’ of minor parties. In that event the existing MMP voting system, with the party vote alone determining the composition of Parliament, could remain unchanged.
So alternative 1- make MMP work better with cross party co-operation, should negate the need for alternative 2- watering down the influence of the minor parties. Alternative 1 would definitely seem a more positive outcome for the country.
3. PASS OVER POLITICAL ROLES TO INDEPENDENT BODIES
Let’s start with a reform where New Zealand did lead the world- giving independence to its central bank, to set base interest rates. Prior to this reform in 1989, ministers of finance used to set interest rates and control monetary policy. Not surprisingly interest rates were often lowered before an election to buoy up the economy. This unfortunate political possibility ceased when monetary policy was entrusted exclusively to the Reserve Bank .
The change was a breath of fresh air. Inflation, which had dogged economies for many years up to the 1980’s, was brought under control. This change was copied around the world. Unfortunately the more recent adoption of ultra-low interest rates and ‘quantitative easing’ by these independent central banks has been more controversial. And of late, the Reserve Bank of New Zealand is looking less independent, as it works in tandem with the Government to help finance the Government’s deficits. But overall, putting monetary policy in the hands of independent central banks, has been a successful move.
Two other New Zealand initiatives to delegate contentious subjects to independent bodies outside the reach of politics have been less successful. Decisions as to which drugs will be funded by the public were given to an independent drug purchasing agency, Pharmac. In practice, people suffering from serious illnesses have been able to get politicians on their side and pressure Pharmac to change decisions, adding drugs to the publicly funded list.
The other less successful use of statutory independence has been the NZ Superannuation Fund. The Government was supposed to make contributions to the fund every year, (to build up assets to help meet the cost of pensions when all the baby boom generation have passed 65). If, because of difficult economic circumstances, the Government couldn’t afford to make the required contribution in any one year, this missed contribution was to be made up in later years. In reality, after 2008, the mandatory annual contribution was ignored by the Government for nine years.
In the same way that later politicians undermined Pharmac’s independent role, they have partly bypassed the objective of the NZ Super Fund. Trying to put things beyond later political interference is not always successful! Where measures are being considered to remove decision making from the political process, it is important those measures are passed with super majorities in the future.
OFFICIAL APPOINTMENTS
What are some other areas where decision making should be passed from the hands of politicians to outside experts? First and foremost, personnel appointed to all state and governmental bodies- to stop political cronyism. There needs to be a whole new Official Appointments body set up for the exclusive purpose of filling positions which are currently appointed by ministers and the Government. The boards of State-Owned Enterprises, of quangos, of District Health Boards, of the Accident Compensation Corporation, NZ Tourism and many others. There must be hundreds of such governmental positions which should be filled by appointments made by a totally independent body, free from political control. Another role it should have is the appointment of members of royal commissions, committees and Enquiries.
I have recently read as background for this book, reports which have just been written by Government committees on health; on education; and on welfare. The members of such committees appeared aligned politically to the Government- and they produced reports which lacked balance as a result. Had such committees been appointed by an independent Official Appointments body, it is probable they would have produced more useful reports.
The more appointments to governmental positions which are taken out of the hands of politicians, the better the country will be.
I should mention the State Services Commission which already appoints heads of government departments. Its primary purpose is to ensure the public service is professionally run and not politicised. But the civil service also appears introverted, with many top public servants being graduates of the Victoria University School of Government and coming from a similar mould. The deficiencies in the Health Department performance during Covid, to the point where control of the borders had to be taken out of its hands, shows our civil service does not perform well enough. The lack of awareness of its own productivity failures, (exemplified by the new public service authorising legislation discussed earlier) shows the civil service is in need of improvement. So putting appointments to the upper echelons of the civil service also into the hands of the independent Official Appointments body, and out of the hands of the State Services Commission, would in my view be a step forward.
Such a specialist Official Appointments body could develop detailed procedures for people to apply for appointments. It could develop vetting teams of experts to check CV’s, and interview applicants. It should have the ability to shoulder tap people (inside and outside the country) it thinks may be suitable for a position even if they have not initially expressed an interest. Political parties, universities, the Institute of Directors, companies – indeed anyone -should have the ability to put forward names to the new body for consideration for particular positions. But the decisions on who would be appointed should finally be made by the new body itself. Prohibit politicians from attempting to influence any member of the new body, in relation to any particular position or appointment.
As for political affiliations, it would not be helpful if the new body appointed a majority to a particular board or panel who were strongly opposed to Government policy. The Government has, after all, been elected to govern and it should not have to battle (say) an appointed board that opposes every new policy within its sphere. Neither would it be helpful for a body to be filled with people wholly aligned with the government. Then it would merely rubber stamp all Government actions and not be truly independent. So make one of the criteria the Official Appointments body has to take into account, that it should restrict the appointment of politically aligned people where this may result in the board or committee becoming politically aligned. I am not saying politically aligned people should be excluded-only that they should be part of the mix, and not a controlling clique on a particular body. In the case of particularly politically sensitive appointments, allow the new body say to put up three names for two positions, and ask the Government to rank the possible candidates. In other words, to sound out political views on rare occasions. But this would need to be carefully constrained, so the politicians never have the final say.
The main problem here? To appoint talented independent people to the Official Appointments body itself. You have a situation like appointments to the US Supreme Court, where politicians want to stack the court, so it comes out with decisions they like. Care would be needed to ensure the new Official Appointments body has truly top drawer, truly politically independent people on it. Avoid political control of the composition of the new body- that is paramount.
OTHER BODIES TO TAKE OVER POLITICAL ROLES:
Could the new Infrastructure Commission actually be given the task of approving all infrastructure projects in New Zealand over a certain minimum figure (which ideally should be low, to restrict Local Bodies having too much of a role)? Allow the Infrastructure Commission exclusively to decide what projects proceed.
Could a new body take Immigration entirely out of the hands of politicians? Immigration is a subject where there is always a suspicion politicians can occasionally interfere (in return for the right size political donation) in who gets residency.
Government should then set the parameters – how much should be spent on Infrastructure each year; how many immigrants in each visa category should be allowed each year. But the detailed decision making should be in totally independent hands. The country would be better off for such changes. Further parallel independent bodies could be established in other areas.
4. MORE SKILLED OUTSIDERS IN THE NZ POLITICAL PROCESS.
PUBLIC SERVICE
Yes, by all means strive for the best Public Service possible, and government of the country will surely be enhanced. But it is likely the Public Service, in trying to stay politically neutral, will sometimes be unable to give advice which is critical of the government; advice which goes outside the square; advice on really contentious political issues. The Service seems insufficiently aware of the need to drive productivity in the New Zealand public sector- a major blind spot.
So while I am sure New Zealand has a fine Public Service by world standards, there are undoubtedly limitations on enhancing government by just seeking to improve the New Zealand Public Service in a parallel way to the excellence model Victorian Britain developed for its civil service- even if New Zealand’s top public servants are appointed in the future by a new Official Appointments body.
INTRODUCE MORE SKILLED OUTSIDERS
If the country can gain the benefit of some of its best brains from academia and from commerce, it will surely be better off. The Asian and US systems which make far wider use of such talented people, surely have merit.
How to involve more top people? Here are some suggestions.
- ADD UNELECTED SKILLED PEOPLE TO CABINET?
Add say three top brains to the Cabinet. Give them speaking rights and even possibly voting rights at the Cabinet. But they would not be MP’s; would not have ministries to run, and would not speak in Parliament. There would obviously need to be careful consideration how they behaved with the media. It does seem a small number of unelected really top people added to cabinet, could hopefully improve decision making there. These appointments would be some of the few which would need to be made solely by the government on political grounds. It would not be sensible for people to be appointed to the Cabinet, which the Cabinet itself was not happy to work with.
- APPOINT SOME STANDING COMMITTEES OF EXPERTS
New Zealand would benefit from greater use of top brains, brought in to sharpen analysis in important areas of government. Perhaps some of these people could be seconded to government for say two or three years, and work permanently for that time. Others may just regularly sit on an advisory committee in their area, and retain their outside position at a University or whatever. Select them all through the new Official Appointments body. Give each group a research staff. The structure of each group may be different- it would be what works best for that group. So if a group decided to investigate a particular topic in its overall sphere, it may engage a couple of top people just to work on that topic. But another group may work differently.
Establish five of such groups, in the areas of economics and finance; social policy; health; education; and government efficiency. A sixth group on climate change could also possibly be considered. The groups should investigate matters within their sphere which they select on their own initiative; as well as matters referred to them by the Government. On some topics they should work collaboratively with the Government, with government departments, and with other key parties (including political parties outside the governing coalition). There are too many long reports written by government agencies already, so if these experts can have input directly into decision making where sensible, that may be the best way to benefit from their skills.
The groups could select other topics for study themselves, investigate and report. Governments would not be bound to act on such reports- but such reports would likely be influential. They could also peer review some government generated reports within their areas.
The committee on Government efficiency should of its own volition, be free to investigate any area of Government activity it chose; and report not so much on whether funds were being lawfully and properly applied (which the Audit Office presently does); but rather on whether that area of government is appropriately achieving its policy objectives, and acting efficiently: a bit like school inspectors.
It should be added that in Singapore especially, and also in other parts of Asia, there is a system similar to this – the best brains in Singapore are constantly being brought to bear, in an attempt to improve the performance of the country and government there.
One area where really smart people are involved in Government in New Zealand at the moment is in structures like the Prime Minister’s Department. . Politicians appoint the members of such groups, so independent views will not always result. While these think tanks no doubt provide valuable input with policy, the problem is their advice is never made public. No one knows if politicians are ignoring high quality advice: which lessens the work of such groups. So giving these new groups of specialists freedom to publish their views when they chose, would be important.
MORE USE OF PUBLIC REFERENDA?
Although the 2020 New Zealand election incorporates two referenda, generally New Zealand makes infrequent use of them. Switzerland in particular and California make wider use of them. Are referenda a further mechanism, by which New Zealand democracy might be improved?
Take political correctness. This impedes public discussion on emotive issues such as race, gender, immigration, and so on. People know discussion on such topics can turn unpleasant, and avoid the topics. But does that mean the public does not have a view? Or is that view just unspoken and unrecognised by decision makers?
Well thought out referenda provide an opportunity for voters to express a view on a part of public policy, without being driven to becoming anti the whole political establishment. After a referendum, a government can say- well the public have made clear their view, so we will alter our immigration policy to accord with the people’s wishes (or whatever other hot button issue has been the subject of the referendum). The government does not have to argue its case on the emotive issue- it has the easy option of just implementing the result of the referendum. The secret vote in a referendum may be a way to overcome political correctness where this makes measured public discussion very difficult. Switzerland may provide a valuable example we could learn from here.
SUMMARY
If our politicians were sufficiently worried, and genuinely decided to work to improve government, achievable changes could definitely be made to our disappointing democracy. Two key principles in such improvements: first, lessen the impact of politicians and increase the role of outside skilled experts. Especially important here, is to pass appointment of all members of government bodies, over to a new Official Appointments body.
Second, where politicians do have to be involved, try to create more flexibility in the way MMP operates, so political parties work together collaboratively on more occasions, and draw the best from all sides of the political spectrum. Super majorities; even mediation among parties, could be tried.
Finally, consider making wider use of Referenda, especially on hot button issues where Political Correctness may otherwise impede public debate.
With a real determination and consensus to improve, I am optimistic that our democracy could be altered so it could implement major change to New Zealand’s society and economy. If conditions favourable for those changes to occur should develop in the post Covid world, let us hope our politicians show they can rise to the occasion.
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Covid – Catalyst for Change 